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METHODS OF DIRECT LEGISLATION IN OREGON.

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The success or failure of direct legislation is usually judged either by the kind of laws passed or by the effect of the law-making process on the citizens. It is usually admitted that in Oregon a large number of laws fulfilling valuable social ends have been passed through the medium of the initiative and the referendum. Indeed, the body of laws, known as the "Oregon System" is the direct result of the initiative and the referendum. It is also admitted that the people of Oregon have become comparatively well educated in governmental and legislative matters as a result of their experience in popular law-making during the past decade.

These two somewhat broad and simple criteria are concerned with the result, whereas the student is also interested in the methods of obtaining these results. A study of the methods furnishes one a somewhat more intimate knowledge than a study of results alone. The manner in which voters use these popular law-making instruments is still a matter of controversy, however. For instance, some observers state that voters of Oregon object to lengthy measures appearing on the ballot and vote them down; while others maintain that voters exercise their capabilities as well in voting on long measures as on short ones. Some other observations concerning which there is speculation are these: that bills calling for the expenditure of money are not passed; that the people will amend their constitution as readily as they will pass bills; that the people do not pass bills of only local interest; that the initiative is more successful at the polls than the referendum; that the publication and distribution of arguments with the measures, voted on previous to the election, increases the vote.

The settlement of questions such as the foregoing will throw considerable light on the capacity of the voters as law-makers. For instance, if it be established that long measures do not receive as large a vote as short ones and that short ones are more readily adopted at the polls, the ability of the people as law-makers would thus seem to be limited.

The method of treating these questions, heretofore, has been personal impressions of observers. Such impressions are, in a large measure, subject to the personal traits of the observer, as, for instance, his capacity for seeing a thing and his personal opinions. This method yields little proof of accuracy for generalizations, but has furnished some interesting results in the nature of analyses of the measures voted on. This has been almost the only possible means of treatment, because the number of measures submitted to the voters has been too small to treat quantitatively. Now, however, Oregon citizens have been making laws for a decade and during that time have voted on 101 measures, a number large enough to yield some statistical results.

It is the purpose of this paper to endeavor to establish as facts, by quantitative measurements, matters now debatable. In doing this, it is also desired, as of equal importance, to describe more adequately the process of law-making in Oregon.

It is observed that most of the questions referred to above are questions of association. For instance, the question, whether short measures poll a larger vote than long ones, is really a question of association, the association of the length of the measure with the size of the vote polled. Are long measures associated with large votes? If this is true, then the question is answered. To arrive at a solution, then, the problem is to measure the degree of association. Such a measure of association can be found; this is called the coefficient of association;* and its nature is such that when there is complete association the coefficient becomes +1 and if there is no association the coefficient becomes 0. For instance, if long measures almost invariably poll large votes, the coefficient of association would be a fraction in the direction of +1. On the other hand, if there is disassociation, the coefficient varies continously between 0 and −1. For instance, if long measures almost invariably poll small votes, the coefficient of association would be a fraction in the direction of −1. A further description and illustration of this method of measurement will be made in the treatment of the first question, which asks whether there is any association between the institutional nature of measures (bills and constitutional amendments), and decisions at the polls (adoptions and rejections).

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* This coefficient was formulated by Mr. G. Udny Yule. His treatment of it is found in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Volume LXXV, Part VI, pp. 579–642. The coefficient here used is called ω, and in the terminology of the four-fold table, $\begin{array}{c|c} a & b \\ \hline c & d \end{array}$ is equal to $\frac{1-\sqrt{k}}{1+\sqrt{k}}$, where $k=\frac{cb}{ad}$. The error of this coefficient, ϵ_ω, is equal to $\frac{1-\omega^2}{4}\sqrt{\frac{1}{a}+\frac{1}{b}+\frac{1}{c}+\frac{1}{d}}$.

Institutional Nature of Measures and Decisions at the Polls. Are bills adopted more readily than constitutional amendments? There have been 61 bills before the voters and 40 constitutional amendments. Of the bills, 24 were adopted and 37 were rejected. Of the constitutional amendments, 18 were adopted and 22 were rejected. The data may be arranged in tabular form as follows:

Institutional Nature of the Measures.	Decisions at Polls.		
	Adopted.	Rejected.	Total.
Bills	24	37	61
Constitutional Amendments	18	22	40
Total	42	59	101

The coefficient of association is found to be −0.06. This is so small,* however, that it does not show any association.

This conception of apparent indifference of voters to whether the measure is a constitutional amendment or a bill is further strengthened by the coefficient of association between the institutional nature of the measures (constitutional amend-

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* The fact that the number of cases dealt with (101) is so small makes very great care in interpreting results necessary. Mr. Yule, in his Introduction to the Theory of Statistics, notes an illustration of the effect of small numbers on the result, seen from the tossing of coins in pairs, where 100 pairs gave the following results.

First toss heads and second heads	26
First toss heads and second tails	18
First toss tails and second heads	27
First toss tails and second tails	29

These data yield a coefficient of association, ω, equal to +0.11. Yet it is fairly certain that there is no such positive association, the result being due to chance.

The coefficient of association (—0.06), found from the data on the institutional nature of measures and decisions at the polls, has an error equal to 0.10. On the assumption of normal distribution the chances are even that the true ω in this case will be between 0 and —0.12, where as the chances are 22 to 1 against the true ω being outside the limits +0.12 and — 0.24. So in no case could the measure of association be very large.

ments and bills) and the sizes of the votes (large and small). In this case, the coefficient* is −0.11. Furthermore, constitutional amendments and bills are equally closely contested at the polls. The coefficient of association† is +0.10 as measured for the association between the institutional nature of the measures (constitutional amendments and bills) and the degree of contest at the polls (closely contested and not closely contested). Mr. Lowell's contention,‡ made seventeen years ago, that the referendum would tend to remove the distinction between constitutional and other laws, is strengthened by the evidence from Oregon.

The Sizes of the Votes. The ability of the people to make laws may be tested by the sizes of the votes cast on the measures at the elections. This may be done in two ways. First, the average vote from election to election may be compared; and, second, the nature of the frequency-distribution of the votes may be observed. With regard to the first point, decreasing averages for the five elections since the operation of the initiative and referendum would seem to indicate that the people's interest in law-making was on the wane, while increasing averages would seem to indicate increased interest. The procession of averages might also indicate fluctuations, such as we know people are liable to. To find the average vote at each election, beginning with 1904, would not yield the information desired, because it would not make allowance for the increase in population, which has been very great in Oregon in the past decade. To eliminate this factor of increase of population, a number has been computed for each election, which would have been the average vote on the measure if as many voters had gone to the polls in these election periods as went in 1912. For instance, in November, 1912, there were 144,113 citizens who voted, and the average vote on the measures was 106,818. (Candidates and measures have been voted on at the same elections.) In November, 1910, there were 120,248 citizens who voted and the average vote on the measures was 85,148. Whereas, if there had been 144,113 voters in 1910, the average vote on the measures would have been, on this basis, 102,177. The corrected averages, then, for the election periods in 1904, 1906, 1908, 1910 and 1912 are respectively, 113,205, 108,442, 106,917, 102,177, and 106,818.*

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* Any vote above the average vote (150,153), was considered large and below the average was considered small. How this average was determined is presented in the paragraph dealing with sizes of the votes. There have been 17 constitutional amendments and 33 bills receiving a large vote. There have been 23 constitutional amendments and 28 bills receiving a small vote.

† The closeness of contest is discussed under the paragraph dealing with the degree of contest at the polls. The differences between the vote for and the vote against a measure indicates the closeness of the contest. All above this average difference (31,785) were considered not closely contested and all below the average were treated as closely contested.

There were 26 constitutional amendments closely contested and 14 not closely contested. There were 24 bills closely contested and 27 not closely contested.

‡ Lowell, Governments and Political Parties in Continental Europe, Vol. II, p. 297.

	1904.	1906.	1908.	1910.	1912.
Average votes on measures	78,075	74,098	86,224	85,148	106,818
Number of citizens voting at polls	99,315	99,445	116,614	120,248	144,113
Percentages; average vote of number voting..................	0.78	0.74	0.74	0.71	0.74

In interpreting these averages it should be borne in mind that the number of measures voted on at each of the respective election periods is 2, 11, 19, 32, and 37. Perhaps the most striking observation to be made from these data is the constancy of the average, showing that the interest of the voters in law-making is constant.

The nature of the frequency-distribution of the votes on the measures is shown in Figure 1. It is seen to be a distribution where there are few measures polling large votes, few measures polling small votes and many measures polling votes near the average in number. In fact, for such a small number of cases, the form of the distribution approaches very closely the normal curve. If there had been many measures on which the votes were large, and many measures on which the votes were small, the situation would have been similar to that of votes for party candidates for offices, where there are large parties and small parties. If such a distribution existed for the votes on measures it would indicate some unusual force at work, as for instance, parties, as an explanation of the extreme fluctuation of interest of the voters. However, the frequency distribution seems to be normal. It is interesting that meas-

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* Another method of getting at the desired information would be to find what percentage the average vote at each election is of the total number of citizens who voted. This information, disclosed in the following table, leads to the same general result as was found by the corrected averages.



FIG. 1.—Frequency-distribution * of votes on initiative and referendum measures voted on in Oregon during the decade, 1903–1913.



FIG. 2.—Frequency-distribution of the votes by which initiative and referendum measures won and lost in Oregon during the decade, 1903–1913. This indicates the distribution of the measures according to the degree that they are closely contested.†

* It is remembered that the votes cast occur over a series of years. To make a frequency-distribution, then, it becomes necessary to eliminate the factor of increase of population. This was done for each measure as it was done in treating averages, which is shown in the first paragraph dealing with the sizes of the votes.

† In obtaining the figures on which Figure 2 is based, allowance was made for the increase in population, as in the treatment of the average votes.

ures regarding the sale of liquor and woman-suffrage amendments have polled the largest votes. The vote has also been large on some single-tax measures. Bills regarding the creation of new counties have polled the smallest votes.* There have also been some tax measures that have polled small votes.

The variation in the sizes of the votes cast on measures furnishes evidence regarding the capacity of the people to make laws. For instance, if the vote on each measure is very nearly the same, it will indicate a lack of discrimination in interest on the part of the people. For the data serving as the basis of Figure 1, the measure of variability, the standard deviation, is 7,531 and the coefficient of variation $\left(\frac{\delta}{A}\right)$, is 0.07, thus showing that there is discrimination of interest on the part of the people in regard to the measures submitted to them.

The Degree of Contest at the Polls. To what extent the measures are closely contested would seem to be related to the intelligence of the voters and to the nature of the laws submitted to the people to be voted on. If all measures were equally closely contested, there would seem to be either an almost unbelievable sameness of laws submitted, or else some extraordinary force in operation, as perhaps parties. If, on the other hand, there is much variation in the degree of contest on the measures, the voters would seem to be using discretion. In speaking of a closely contested measure, there is meant one where the difference between a vote for and a vote against a measure is small; and the difference between a vote for and a vote against a measure is the numerical expression for the degree of contest. Figure 2 shows the frequency-distribution of the votes indicating the degree of contest at the polls. It is to be observed that most of the measures are fairly closely contested; also that the variation in the degree of contest is quite great. The measure of this variation, the standard deviation, is 21,807 and the coefficient of variation, $\left(\frac{\delta}{A}\right)$, is 0.68. This is a very high degree of variation and shows considerable discrimination on the part of the voters. The most closely contested measure was an income tax measure, and the least closely contested measure was a measure providing for a gross-earnings tax on express, telephone, and telegraph companies.

Methods of Submitting Measures and Decisions at the Polls. The question has arisen, Do the citizens, in voting, discriminate between an initiative measure and a referendum measure with regard to willingness to adopt or to reject? If they do, it tends to show a particular care for these methods; if not it would tend to show that attention is focused on the nature of the bill, rather than the nature of its presentation. Of the initiative measures submitted to the voters, 33 have been adopted and 43 have been rejected; 9 referendum measures have been adopted and 16 referendum measures have been rejected. These data show the coefficient of association to be +0.08, the measure of association between the methods of submitting measures (initiative and referendum) and the decisions at the polls (adoption and rejection). There is no indication from this evidence, then, that it makes any difference to the voters whether the measure is submitted by initiative or referendum.

Money-Bills and Decisions at the Polls. It has been frequently said that the people in Oregon will not adopt bills providing for the expenditure of money. Are the people conservative in spending money? If they are, then how much so? In collecting data on this question, it was first necessary to determine what bills provided for the expenditure of money. In order to do this there was used the conception that a money-bill is one authorizing the expenditure, or the power to expend, money of the general state more than an insignificant sum in amount; this authorization being fairly easily recognizable from the text or the title of the measure. There is still some difficulty in making this classification certain. In the appendix to this paper will be found a list of the bills declared money bills. In other cases, where the classification was doubtful, the appendix will indicate the choices made. Of the bills not providing for the expenditure of money, 34 were adopted and 39 were rejected. Of the money-bills, 8 were adopted and 20 were rejected. These yield a coefficient of +0.19; the probable-error of this coefficient is 0.08. It is probable then from the Oregon experience that money-bills are more readily rejected than adopted, though this tendency is not carried to any great degree. However, money-bills are not associated with any larger vote nor are they more closely contested as the two coefficients* in these two cases are respectively +0.007 and +0.07.

Sizes of the Votes and Decisions at the Polls. The measures that are adopted do not draw larger votes nor are they more closely contested than those rejected. The respective coefficients† of association are +0.11 and +0.04. These coefficients seem to indicate that the voters are as interested in rejecting a measure as they are in adopting it; also that they will decide on a measure by a large margin as readily as by a small margin.

Local or General Nature of Measures and Decisions at the Polls. Several times there have appeared on the ballot bills which citizens refer to as local in nature. And by "local in nature" is not meant a bill which is voted on only by a single county or locality; but one that is voted on by the whole state, but applying with particular emphasis to some special locality. An illustration is a measure establishing a normal school at a specified place; another, one changing the boundaries of a county. It is, of course, not always easy for the classifier to say when a bill is local in nature or general. For instance, the appropriation for a building at the state university was classified as a bill general in nature. It is argued that the people ought to vote only on measures general in nature, and leave those measures necessarily local in nature to be handled by the state legislature. If the people consider the appearance of measures, local in nature, on the ballot, an abuse of direct legislation and think that such measures ought to be handled by the state legislature, there will be an association between local measures and rejection at the polls. This is probably true, as the coefficient of association* is +0.13. Such association seems to be only very slight, however. If the people objected to the use of the ballot for measures local in nature, these measures would not be closely contested. They are not. For the association of the nature of the measures (general and local) with the degree of contest at the polls (closely contested and not closely contested) the coefficient † is +0.21. Here again, however, the association is not very great. Furthermore, measures, local in nature, draw smaller votes; the coefficient of association‡ is +0.26. (Of the 19 measures classified as local in nature, 10 had to do with either creating new counties or changing county boundaries.) If the interpretation of the meaning of these coefficients is correct, then the people probably feel moderately that the legislature should decide on measures, local in nature.

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* Of the money-bills, 14 received a large vote and 14 received a small vote. Of the non-money-bills, 36 received a large vote and 37 received a small vote.

Of the money-bills, 18 were closely contested and 10 were not closely contested; of the non-money-bills, 24 were closely contested and 31 were not closely contested.

† Of the measures adopted, 24 received large votes and 19 received small votes. Of the measures rejected, 26 received large votes and 32 received small votes.

Of the measures adopted, 26 were closely contested and 16 were not closely contested. Of the measures rejected, 34 were closely contested and 25 were not closely contested.

Publications of Arguments and Sizes of Votes. A pamphlet (or book as the case may be), containing a text of the measures to be voted on is mailed to each voter by the secretary of state just prior to the election. Provision has been made for publishing in this pamphlet, after each measure, arguments for or against the particular measure or both, submitted by interested persons or organizations. The use of space in this pamphlet is optional; as a result there are many cases where it is not used. The question arises, Does this publication of arguments stimulate the vote? In endeavoring to answer this question, it is desirable to measure the association between the publications of arguments (arguments for or against, or both, and no arguments), and the sizes of the votes (large and small). This has been done and the coefficient of association § is +0.01, thus indicating that the publication of arguments is not associated with large votes. This may not mean that the publication of arguments has not stimulated votes; as those measures of widest general interest may have been especially selected as not needing the publication of arguments. Familiarity with the pamphlets, however, leads one to think that there is hardly such a selection.

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* Of the measures, general in nature, 36 were adopted and 46 were rejected. Of the measures, local in nature, 6 were adopted and 13 were rejected.

† Of the measures, general in nature, 52 were closely contested and 30 were not closely contested. Of the measure, local in nature, 8 were closely contested and 11 were not closely contested.

‡ Of the measures, general in nature, 45 polled a large vote and 37 polled a small vote. Of the measures, local in nature, 5 polled a large vote and 14 polled a small vote.

§ Of these measures, published with arguments either for or against a measure, or both, 32 received a large vote and 32 received a small vote. Of these measures published without argument, 18 received a large vote and 19 received a small one.

Publications of Arguments and Decisions at the Polls. Does the publication of an argument against a measure help its defeat? Does the publication of an affirmative argument materially assist in the passage of the measure? Taking up for consideration the first question, the comparison is only between those measures with a negative argument on the one hand and, on the other hand, those measures without arguments and those with arguments both affirmative and negative. Those measures with an affirmative argument only are not included in the data for this problem. Of the measures with only a negative argument, 11 were rejected at the polls and 1 was adopted. Of those measures with no argument and of those with both negative and affirmative arguments, 32 were rejected and 33 were adopted. These yield a coefficient of association equal to $+0.54$ with a probable-error of 0.12. Thus arguments against measures are associated with their rejection.

The question next to be considered is, Does the publication of an affirmative argument assist in the passage of the bill? The data used in determining the answer to this question consist of those measures published with only an affirmative argument on the one hand, and, on the other hand, those published without any argument and those published with both negative and affirmative arguments. Those measures published with only a negative argument are not included in the data for this problem. Of those measures with only an affirmative argument, 7 were adopted and 15 were rejected. Of those measures with no arguments and those with both negative and affirmative arguments, 32 were adopted and 32 were rejected. These data show a negative association between the publication of an affirmative argument and adoption at the polls. The coefficient is -0.19 with a probable-error of 0.08. The chances are, then, that an affirmative argument is slightly associated with rejection at the polls. The significance of these somewhat curious results is hard to surmise. It seems though that an argument for a measure is at least not associated with its success at the polls, while an argument against a measure seems definitely to be associated with its failure at the polls.

The Length of Measures and Decisions at the Polls. To know the length of the measures that have been submitted to the voters of Oregon through the medium of the initiative and referendum is important. It has been often remarked that the measures are too long. It is interesting, then, to observe that one half of the measures submitted are less than 400 words long, less than a page in length. Of the 101 measures submitted to the voters, 18 are less than 100 words in length and 36 are less than 200 words. Two thirds of the measures submitted are less than 800 words, or one and three fourths pages. However, there have been eight measures over five pages long and one of these contained more than a million words. In the measurement of the length of measures, all measures containing less words than the median, which was 400 words long, are called short measures and those measures of more than 400 words are considered long measures.

What is the degree of association between the length of measures and decisions at the polls? Do short measures tend to be adopted more readily? The coefficient of association * is +0.11 with a probable-error of 0.07. The chances are, then, that if there is any association between short measures and success at the polls it is so small as to be insignificant. The opinion that the voters are indifferent to the length of the measures is further strengthened by the coefficient of association between the sizes of the votes (large and small) and the length of measures (short and long). The coefficient of association† is +0.03. The association is so small as to be insignificant, and the length of the measures has nothing to do with the sizes of the votes.

Agencies of Public Opinion and Decisions at the Polls. The investigation, so far, has shown that the influences of certain forces on the voters, often considered to be strong are either negative or exist only to a small degree. This suggests that the quality of the measures is the big determining force exerted upon the voters. This raises the question, as to what guidance exists for the voters in the matter of the quality of the measures and to what extent these respective guiding agencies really influence the voters. There are, of course, many such guiding agencies, the press, organizations, speakers, publications of literature. To measure the influence of each of these agencies is difficult. Only two such influences seem to admit of quantitative measurement; one is the influence of a newspaper, the *Oregonian*, and the other the influence of a civic organization, the Taxpayers' League. It has been the practice, during the later election periods, for these two institutions to publish prior to election day their recommendations to the voters on each measure. This is usually done by analyzing the measures and by giving reasons. These are eventually condensed to a recommendation of yes or no, and printed in a column sufficiently small to be taken to the polls by the voter. This practice has been in existence only since the number of measures submitted to the voters has been large; and there are some measures upon which there is no recommendation. This, of course, makes the numbers very small for statistical treatment.

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* Of the short measures, 26 received large votes and 25 received small votes. Of the long measures, 24 received large votes and 26 received small votes.

† Of the short measures, 24 were adopted and 27 were rejected. Of the long measures, 18 were adopted and 32 were rejected.

The *Oregonian* has made 68 such recommendations and 39 of these have been the same as the decisions of the voters at the polls, making a coincidence in 57 per cent. of the instances. Of their recommendations for adoption, 8 measures were adopted and 12 were rejected. Of their recommendations for rejection 17 measures were adopted and 31 were rejected. The coefficient of association is +0.05; not significant. The Taxpayers' League has made 41 such recommendations and 31 of these have been the same as the voters' decisions, making a coincidence in 76 per cent. of the instances. Of their recommendations for adoption, 10 were adopted and 8 were rejected. Of their recommendations for rejection, 2 were adopted and 21 were rejected. The coefficient of association is +0.57 with a probable error of 0.10. This seems to indicate an association between the recommendations of the Taxpayers' League and the decisions of the voters at the polls. However, it should be remembered that the number of cases is so small as to make the interpretation coefficients not certain.

To avoid the difficulty of such small numbers of cases, the data has been broadened to include city (Portland) measures, in addition to the state measures. Portland is the largest city of Oregon and possesses nearly one third of the population of Oregon. Portland has had a local initiative and referendum law since 1906. The seat of both the *Oregonian* and the Taxpayers' League is in Portland. If both city and state measures are included, the *Oregonian* has made 101 recommendations, 65 per cent. of which have coincided with the decisions of the voters. The coefficient of association* is +0.23 with a probable error of 0.10. Including both city and state measures, the Taxpayers' League has made 134 recommendations, 70 per cent. of which have coincided with the decisions of the voters. The coefficient of association† is +0.48. The interpretation of these data, then, leads to the conclusion that these two institutions exert a real influence on the decisions at the polls; the influence of the Taxpayers' League being somewhat stronger.

Conclusions. With regard to the results of this investigation, the associations measured stand as facts, subject, of course, to the probabilities due to the small number of cases. These are sufficiently indicated by the sizes of the coefficients and their errors. If the interpretation of the meaning of the coefficients extends further than the established associations, it becomes dependent on the meaning of the data, and varies according to personal interpretations. The range and possibility of this variation is not great, owing to the quantitative measurements. Remembering this, the results of this investigation may be summed up as follows:

It makes no difference to the voters at the polls whether a measure is a constitutional amendment or a bill.

The interest of the people in law-making has not diminished nor increased nor fluctuated. It has been constant and steady.

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* Of the city and state measures recommended for adoption by the Oregonian, 17 were adopted and 16 were rejected. Of those recommended for rejection, 20 were adopted and 48 were rejected.

† Of the city and state measures recommended for adoption by the Taxpayers' League, 45 were adopted and 31 were rejected. Of those recommended for rejection 9 were adopted and 49 were rejected.

The interest of the voters, as shown by the sizes of the votes, is normal and shows no large and unusual force at work.

The variation of the sizes of the votes shows that the voters use discrimination in voting.

More measures are closely contested than not and the large amount of variation in the degree to which the measures are contested shows very decidedly that the voters use discrimination.

It makes no difference to the voters at the polls whether the measure is an initiative measure or a referendum measure.

Voters reject money-bills more readily than bills not calling for the expenditure of money. This tendency is very slight, however.

Voters are as interested in rejecting and adopting a measure vigorously as they are in passing a closely contested measure.

The people are less interested in measures, local in nature, and the chance of such a measure passing is not quite so good as a measure, general in nature. This may be interpreted as meaning that the people have a slight preference for the action of the state legislature on measures, local in nature.

The publication and distribution of arguments with the measure submitted does not increase the vote.

The publication of negative arguments alone and of affirmative arguments alone are associated with defeat at the polls.

The tendency is to submit short measures to the voters.

It makes no difference to the voters at the polls whether a measure is a long one or a short one.

The publication of recommendations by two agencies of public opinion influences the voters, but not to any very great extent.

The above-mentioned inflences on the voter, often considered strong, exist if at all only in a small degree. The big determining force on the voters is the quality of the measures.

APPENDIX.

Initiative and Referendum Measures Voted on in Oregon.

KEY.

(A)	Constitutional amendment.
(a)	Bill.
(B)	Initiative measure.
(b)	Referendum measure.
(C)	Measure providing for expenditure of money.*
(c)	Measure not providing for expenditure of money.
(D)	Measure general in nature.*
(d)	Measure local in nature.
(E)	Long measure.*
(e)	Short measure.
(F^{1})	Measure published with an affirmative argument.*
(F^{2})	Measure published with a negative argument.
(F^{12})	Measure published with an affirmative and a negative argument.
(f)	Measure published without an argument.
(G)	Measure the adoption of which was recommended by the *Oregonian.**
(g)	Measure the rejection of which was recommended by the *Oregonian.*
(H)	Measure the adoption of which was recommended by the Taxpayers' League.*
(h)	Measure the rejection of which was recommended by the Taxpayers' League.

	General Election, June 6, 1904.	*Yes.*	*No.*
(aBCDEf)	Direct Primary Nominating Elections Law†	56,205	16,354
(aBcDEf)	Local Option Liquor Law	43,316	40,198
	General Election, June 4, 1906.		
(abCDef)	General appropriation bill, State Institutions	43,918	26,758
(ABcDeF^{12})	Equal Suffrage Amendment	36,902	47,075
(aBcDEf)	Amendment to Local Option Liquor Law	35,297	45,144
(aBCdef)	Purchase of Barlow toll road by State	31,525	44,527
(ABcDef)	Requiring referendum on any act calling a constitutional convention	47,661	18,751

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* The definitions of the different kinds of measures indicated by the key will be found in the text of the article to which this is an appendix.

† The order of the listing of the measures is the same as appeared on the ballot.

The titles of the measures presented here are abbreviated. This was done by the Secretary of State of Oregon.

(ABcDef)	Giving cities sole powers to amend their charters	52,567	19,852
(ABcDef)	Authorizing State Printer's compensation to be regulated by law at any time	63,749	9,571
(ABcDef)	Initiative and referendum to apply to all local, special and municipal laws	47,678	16,735
(aBcDef)	Prohibiting free passes on railroads	57,281	16,779
(aBcDEf)	Gross earnings tax on sleeping, refrigerator and oil car companies	69,635	6,441
aBcDEf)	Gross earnings tax on express, telephone and telegraph companies	70,872	6,360
	General Election, June 1, 1908.		
(AbCDefg)	To increase compensation of legislators from $120 to $400 per session	19,691	68,892
(AbcDefg)	Permitting location of State Institutions at places other than at the State Capital	41,971	40,868
(AbCDEfH)	Reorganizing system of Courts and increasing the number of Supreme Judges from three to five	30,243	50,591
(AbcDefgH)	Changing date of General Elections from June to November	65,728	18,591
(abcDef)	Giving sheriffs control of county prisoners	60,443	30,033
(abcDEF^2gh)	Requiring railroads to give public officials free passes	28,856	59,406
(abCDeF^1h)	Appropriating $100,000 for building armories	33,507	54,848
(abCDeF^{12}GH)	Increasing annual appropriation for University of Oregon from $47,500 to $125,000	44,115	40,535
(ABcDeF^{12})	Equal Suffrage	36,858	58,670
(aBcdEF^{12}g)	Fishery law proposed by fish wheel operators	46,582	40,720
(ABcDeF^{12}gh)	Giving cities control of liquor selling, pool-rooms, theatres, etc., subject to Local Option Law	39,442	52,346
(ABcDeF^1gh)	Modified form of single tax amendment	32,066	60,871
(ABCDEfg)	Recall power on public officials	58,381	31,002
(aBcDefg)	Instructing legislators to vote for the people's choice for United States Senator	69,668	21,162
(ABcDefg)	Authorizing proportional representation law	48,868	34,128

(aBcDEF^{1}g)	Corrupt practices Act governing elections	54,042	31,301
(aBcdeF^{12}g)	Fishery law proposed by gill-net operators	56,130	30,280
(ABcDeF^{1}gH)	Requiring indictment to be by grand jury	52,214	24,487
(aBcdEF^1)	Creating Hood River County	43,948	26,778
	General Election, November 8, 1910.		
(ABcDeF^{12}g)	Permitting female taxpayers to vote	35,270	59,065
(abCdEF^{1}G)	Establishing branch insane asylum in eastern Oregon	50,134	41,504
(abCDEF^{2}G)	Calling convention to revise State Constitution	23,143	59,974
(AbcDeF^{2}G)	Providing separate district for election of each State Senator and representative	24,000	54,252
(AbcDeF^{1}g)	Repealing requirement that all taxes shall be equal and uniform	37,619	40,172
(AbCDEF^{1}g)	Permitting organized districts to vote bonds for construction of railroads by such districts	32,844	46,070
(AbcDefg)	Authorizing collection of State and County taxes on separate classes of property	31,629	41,692
(abCdefG)	Requiring Baker county to pay $1,000 a year to Circuit Judge in addition to his State salary	13,161	71,503
(aBcdEF^{1}g)	Creating Nesmith County from parts of Lane and Douglas	22,866	60,951
(aBCdeF^1)	To establish a State Normal School at Monmouth	50,191	40,044
(aBcdEF^{1}g)	Creating Otis County from parts of Harney, Malheur and Grant	17,426	62,016
(aBcdEF^{12}g)	Annexing part of Clackamas County to Multnomah	16,250	69,002
(aBcdEF^{1}g)	Creating Williams County from parts of Lane and Douglas	14,508	64,090
(ABcDefg)	Permitting people of each county to regulate taxation for county purposes and abolishing poll taxes	44,171	42,127
(ABcDeF^{12})	Giving cities and towns exclusive power to regulate liquor traffic within their limits	53,321	50,779
(aBcDEF^{1}g)	For protection of laborers in hazardous employment, fixing employers' liability, etc	56,258	33,943

(aBcdEF^{12}g)	Creating Orchard County from part of Umatilla	15,664	62,712
(aBcdEF^{1}g)	Creating Clark County from part of Grant	15,613	61,704
(aBCdeF^{1})	To establish State Normal School at Weston	40,898	46,234
(aBcdeF^{2}g)	To annex part of Washington County to Multnomah	14,047	68,221
(aBCdEF^{1})	To establish State Normal School at Ashland	38,473	48,655
(ABcDeF^{12}g)	Prohibiting liquor traffic	43,540	61,221
(aBcDEF^{12}g)	Prohibiting sale of liquors, and regulating shipments of same, and providing for search for liquors	42,651	63,564
(aBcDEF^{2})	Creating board to draft employers' liability law for submission to legislature	32,224	51,719
(aBcdeF^{12}g)	Prohibiting taking of fish in Rogue River except with hook and line	49,712	33,397
(aBcdEF^{12}g)	Creating Des Chutes County out of part of Crook	17,592	60,486
(aBcDEF^{1}g)	Bill for general law under which new counties may be created or boundaries changed	37,129	42,327
(ABCDeF^{1}G)	Permitting counties to vote bonds for permanent road improvement	51,275	32,906
(aBCDEF^{12}g)	Permitting voters in direct primaries to express choice for President and Vice-President, to select delegates to national conventions, and nominate candidates for presidental electors	43,353	41,624
(aBCDEF^{12}g)	Creating board of people's inspectors of government, providing for reports of board in official State Gazette to be mailed to all registered voters bimonthly	29,955	52,538
(ABcDEF^{12}g)	Extending Initiative and Referendum, making terms of members of legislature 6 years, increasing salaries, requiring proportional representation in legislature, election of speaker of house and president of senate outside of members, etc.	37,031	44,366
(ABcDEfg)	Permitting three fourths verdict in civil cases	44,538	39,399
	General Election, November 5, 1912.		
(ABcDeF^{12}G)	Woman Suffrage Amendment	61,265	57,104

(AbCDeF^1GH)	Creating office of Lieutenant Governor	50,562	61,644
(AbcDeF^{12}GH)	Divorce of local and state taxation	51,852	56,671
(AbcDeF^{12}GH)	Permitting different tax rates on classes of property	52,045	54,483
(AbcDeF^{12}GH)	Repeal of County tax option	63,881	47,150
(AbcDeF^2h)	Majority Rule on constitutional amendments	32,934	70,325
(AbcDefGH)	Double liability on bank stockholders	82,981	21,738
(abcDEF^2GH)	State-wide public utilities regulation	65,985	40,956
(aBcdEF^{12}g)	Creating Cascade County	26,463	71,239
(aBCDEF^{12}GH)	Millage tax for University and Agricultural College—Simple tax law	48,701	57,279
(ABcDEF^{12}h)	Majority Rule on initiated laws	35,721	68,861
(aBCDEF^1h)	County bonding and road construction act,—Grange Bill	49,699	56,713
(aBCDEF^1h)	Creating State Highway Department —Grange Bill	23,872	83,846
(aBcDeF^2gh)	Changing date State Printer Bill Became effective	34,793	69,542
(aBCDEF^2gh)	Creating office of Hotel Inspector	16,910	91,995
(aBcDEfg)	Eight hour day on public works	64,508	48,078
(aBcDEF^{12}gh)	Blue Sky Law	48,765	57,293
(aBcDefgH)	Prohibiting private employment of convicts	73,800	37,492
(aBcDEfgH)	Relating to employment of county and city prisoners	71,367	37,731
(aBCDEfH)	State road bonding act	30,897	75,590
(ABcDefH)	Limiting state road indebtedness	59,452	43,447
(aBCDEfH)	County bonding act	43,611	60,210
(ABcDefH)	Limiting county road indebtedness	57,258	43,858
(aBcDEfGh)	Providing method for consolidating cities and creating new counties	40,199	56,992
(ABcDeF^2GH)	Income tax amendment	52,702	52,948
(aBcDEF^{12}Gh)	Tax exemption on household effects	60,357	51,826
(aBcDeF^{12}gh)	Tax exemption on moneys and credits	42,491	66,540
(aBcDEF^{12}gh)	Revising inheritance tax laws	38,609	63,839
(aBcDEfgh)	Freight rates act	58,306	45,534
(ABCDEF^1h)	County road bonding act	38,568	63,481
(ABcDEF^{12}gh)	Abolishing Senate; proxy voting; U'Ren Constitution	31,020	71,183
(ABcDEF^{12}gh)	State-wide Single Tax with graduated tax jug handle	31,534	82,015
(aBcDefg)	Abolishing capital punishment	41,951	64,578
(aBcDEF^2h)	Prohibiting boycotting	49,826	60,560
(aBcDeF^2Gh)	Giving mayor authority to control street speaking	48,987	62,532
(abCDefGh)	Appropriation for University	29,437	78,985
(abCDefGh)	Appropriation for University	27,310	79,376